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I. INTRODUCTION
Asking the right question can be as important as giving the right
answer. In her book Judging Civil Justice, Dame Hazel Genn
forcefully argues that the right question about the civil justice system is
not "[h]ow much justice can we afford" but "how much justice can we
afford to forego."' Genn has spent her professional lifetime studying
* © 2010 Elizabeth G. Thornburg. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law; B.A., College of William and Mary; J.D., Southern Methodist
University.
1. HAZEL GENN, JUDGING CVIL JUSTICE 15 (2010) (alteration in original). Hazel
Genn is a Professor of Socio-Legal Studies at University College London. Judging Civil
Justice grows out of the Hamlyn Lectures, which she delivered in 2008 in London and
Edinburgh. The prestigious Hamlyn Lectures, of which Genn's were the sixtieth, are funded
by the Hamlyn Trust, which was created by the will of the late Miss Emma Warburton
Hamlyn, who died in 1941. The first Hamlyn Lecture (1949) was delivered by Lord
Denning, and the list of all the lecturers includes prominent Law Lords, practitioners, and




methods for resolving civil disputes. A pioneer in empirical legal
studies, she has for thirty years interviewed litigants, lawyers, and
judges and studied courts, tribunals, and ADR methods. Genn is a
clear-eyed observer, deeply sympathetic to the plight of modem courts
but unwilling to ignore the politics that underlie the rhetoric of court
reform today.
Although the specific symptoms come from the English civil
courts, Genn's diagnosis has important lessons for nations the world
over that are struggling with the trade-offs between justice and delay,
between competing demands for government funds, and between the
private and public aspects of dispute resolution.! She challenges both
policy makers and ordinary citizens to focus on the benefits the court
system provides:
We need a positive understanding of the role and value of the civil
justice system.... Our judgment about the quality of our civil justice
system should not be measured simply in terms of speed and
cheapness, or by how many cases we can persuade to go elsewhere....
[W]e need to re-establish civil justice as a public good, recognising that
it has a significant social purpose that is as important to the health of
society as criminal justice.
The challenge is thus to do the balancing in a different way-one that
recognizes that the resolution of civil disputes is a public good, that
gives weight to the accuracy of enforcement of legal norms, and that
pays heed to the benefits of litigation and not just its costs.
Genn's critique begins by exposing the severe underfunding of
the civil side of the English court system, followed by an examination
of its result: civil justice policy that focuses first and foremost on
pushing cases out of the court system.4 This manifests itself in
processes that discourage litigation, efforts to move disputes into
mediation, and the changed role of judges as they are expected to
"manage" more cases more quickly with fewer resources. To justify
these measures, legal elites disparage litigation-including the
unseemly tendency of judges themselves to suggest that adjudication is
overpriced and unreliable and no more worthy than any other method
of resolving disputes. Throughout the book, Genn bemoans the lack of
empirical data supporting and evaluating changes adopted under the
rubric of court reform.
2. See id
3. Id. at 76-77.
4. See id. at 32.
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Her message has not been greeted with unanimous praise.
"Some months have passed since I delivered the lectures and in the
intervening period, as a result of both oral and written communi-
cations, I have realised, . .. first how controversial were some of my
views and second how very strongly those ... who disagree with me
feel about the subject."' While her information is accurate, her
interpretation raised hackles. Suggesting out loud that the efforts to
limit civil litigation might be motivated by something other than the
desire for justice broke a professional taboo. Clearly by advocating
greater funding of civil courts, less slavish adulation of mediation, and
a more nuanced view of the judicial role, she risks the ire of
politicians, ADR providers, and managerial judges.
Judging Civil Jusdce is valuable on its own terms as an
examination of recent policy decisions that brought about dramatic
changes in England's civil courts. For readers in other countries,
though, it has an additional benefit. Genn's book is a lens through
which we can examine our own legal systems more clearly. Its
depiction of the logical consequences of case-management-meets-
tight-budgets provides a sobering view of dispute resolution stripped
of its lawmaking, norm-setting function. The book also illustrates the
abundant cross-fertilization of procedural thought: case management
techniques were pioneered in U.S. federal courts, where they spread
from huge cases to ordinary ones despite a lack of empirical evidence
that they in fact saved time or money.' They were picked up in other
countries, most notably and dramatically by Lord Woolf, the architect
of England's procedural revolution of the 1990s.' Now Genn has
analyzed ten years of experience under Woolf's rules and government
budget cuts, utilizing the practical and jurisprudential concerns of
American academics like Luban, Galanter, and Resnik' as well as
5. Id. at 187.
6. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EvALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT, at xx-xxxi (1996) (finding that early case
management was associated with shorter time to disposition and significantly increased
attorney work hours and that setting an early trial date was the only management tool that had
a statistically significant effect on time to disposition, cost of litigation, lawyer satisfaction, or
perception of fairness); see FED. R. Cly. P. 16. See genemaly JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM.
ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., CIVIL LmGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 2001, http://
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsflookup/civlitig0l.pdf/$file/civlitig01.pdf.
7. LORD JUSTICE WOOLF, ACCESS o JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT pt. 2 (1996), available
athttp://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/fmallindex.htm.
8. David Luban, Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown
University; Marc Galanter, John and Rylla Bosshard Professor of Law and South Asian
Studies, University of Wisconsin and LSE Centennial Professor, London School of
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leading British procedure scholars like Jacob, Zuckerman, and Zander
in examining the resulting English system.'
U.S. readers of Judging Civil Justice will learn more about both
the British system and their own by considering Genn's account. At
this very moment, the American Bar Association is concerned that
pretrial processing has replaced trial to such an extent that trials have
"vanished."" In addition to using aggressive management tactics and
mandatory mediation, courts enthusiastically enforce predispute
arbitration clauses, even in cases involving statutory rights and
adhesion contracts." Meanwhile, amid continuing clamor for faster
and cheaper litigation, the United States Supreme Court has ratcheted-
up the pleading requirements to try to keep cases out of the courts at
the outset,12 and the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure hosted a conference in May 2010 to consider requiring
heightened pleading and allowing less discovery." Civil justice is up
for grabs, as Genn's book provocatively warns.
II. JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE
A. The Case for CivilAdjudication as a Public Good
Judghg Civil Justice begins with a reflection on the function of
the court system, and especially on the ways in which the role of the
courts goes beyond merely processing and resolving private disputes.
"If the law is the skeleton that supports liberal democracies, then the
Economics and Political Science; Judith Resnik, Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale
University.
9. GENN, supra note 1, at xiii, 2-3; Sir Jack Jacob, deceased, in his time the leading
civil proceduralist in England and Hamlyn Lecturer in 1986 ("The Fabric of Civil Justice");
Adrian Zuckerman, Oxford University (Fellow, University College); Michael Zander,
Professor Emeritus, London School of Economics and Political Science.
10. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Tral: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 459, 459-61, 475-76
(2004); see also Marc Galanter, A World Without Tials., 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 7, 8.
11. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunlang the
Supreme Court Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WAsH. U. L.Q. 637, 644-74 (1996).
Developments in arbitration law have further expanded contractual ability to opt out of the
court system, and the Supreme Court recently held that an arbitrator, under certain
circumstances, has the exclusive authority to determine whether an arbitration clause is
enforceable. SeeRent-a-Center v. Jackson, No. 09-497, slip op. at 9-12 (U.S. June 21, 2010).
12. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, No. 07-1015, slip op. at 23 (U.S. May 28, 2009); Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
13. Barry Bauman, ACTL-L4ALS Report Paves Way for Fundamental Rule
Reforms, METROPOLrrAN CoRP. CouNs., Feb. 1, 2010, at 13, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.
com/pdfl2010/February/13.pdf ("We are very hopeful that the Federal Judicial Conference
rule-making committees will soon undertake the first overall exhaustive review of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure since they were promulgated in 1938.").
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machinery of civil justice is some of the muscle and ligaments that
make the skeleton work."4 Genn reminds us that beyond the
mechanical operations of the courts lie decisions about rights.
"[H]aving imposed duties and obligations, having devised a policy for
enforcing behaviour or ameliorating some social ill, what opportunities
and structures do we provide for the public to enforce those rights and
obligations or make good their entitlements?"" Procedure, then, must
be recognized as the means by which substantive rights are enforced.
The resulting decisions are the means through which the substantive
law is developed and articulated.
Adjudication itself is an important part of this public function.
Even though most cases do settle, a credible threat of litigation is
important to the enforcement of underlying norms, and it is
adjudicated cases that give the courts the opportunity to articulate
those norms, to interpret and develop the law." Here Genn uses the
example of one of the most famous English tort cases of all time, a
case that set the stage for modern product liability law:
Take the case of Mrs Donoghue and the snail in the ginger beer
bottle, decided by the House of Lords in 1932." The case effectively
transformed the law. Whatever view is taken of the decision, the case
established protection for consumers, created an incentive for those who
create risks to take care and the possibility of redress for those harmed
by negligent actions. In this way the common law has developed on the
back of private and business disputes and thousands of cases have been
settled in its wake.
What would have happened, she asks, if Mrs. Donoghue's claim was
instead managed and settled away?
Having argued for the public importance of civil litigation, Germ
turns to pressure points that threaten its role. She identifies two
forces-which she labels external and internal-that challenge the
public's access to the court system. The external threat takes the form
of resource constraints. In England, a single Ministry of Justice
administers both the civil and criminal side of the courts, and the
inexorable demands of the criminal side have continually leeched
budget from the civil side. The internal threat is philosophical and
14. GENN, supm note 1, at 4.
15. Id. at 11 (alteration in original).
16. Id. at 20-21.





rhetorical. In the process of endorsing valuable options for improving
civil justice, the advocates of case management and alternative dispute
resolution (including judges) have, Genn suggests, marketed their
services by bashing the courts, arguing that "adjudication is always
unpleasant and unnecessary," that "there are no rights that cannot be
compromised and that every conflict represents merely a clash of
morally equivalent interests."" fudging Civil Justice sees an unholy
alliance between government bean counters and ADR hawkers
growing out of these twin threats. "A powerful meeting of minds has
developed between an emerging profession of private dispute resolvers
and judicial opinion formers which perfectly suits the financial
realities of a cash-strapped justice system struggling to process a
growing number of criminal defendants."20
B. Starving the Courts
Teeing up the issue as whether the "underpinning structures and
processes of the civil justice system may be crumbling,"' Judghg
Civil Justice turns more specifically to the declining support for civil
courts. Genn suggests that in England, the government deliberately
discouraged the filing and encouraged the quick disposition of civil
cases for budgetary reasons. Like any other government agency, the
Lord Chancellor's Department (now the Ministry of Justice) set
spending targets, including targets that required a decreased number of
civil cases. The Department is judged on its ability to meet those
targets, and so it took action, most notably the decrease in legal aid and
drastic increase in court user fees, to get the numbers down.22
On the legal aid front, the government cut the budget that
provided lawyers to indigent citizens (with most remaining funds
needed for criminal defense). For example, between 1997 and 2005,
expenditure on civil legal aid fell by a quarter while spending on
criminal matters increased by thirty-seven percent. "Like all areas of
public expenditure," said the Department for Constitutional Affairs,
"legal aid has to live within an overall budget and the demands on the
scheme must be met from within that budget. The growth in criminal
spending has meant we have had to reduce the spending on civil,
19. Id at 24-25.
20. Id. at 25.
21. Id. at 26.
22. Robert Dingwall & Emilie Cloatre, Vanisiang Tials. An English Perspecdve,
2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 51, 67.
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particularly on legal [aid] help, and family legal aid."23 The case for
these cuts was made not by admitting that some people would not get
help, but by attacking lawyers. The Lord Chancellor at the time, Lord
Irvine, reframed legal aid as a "gravy train for 'fat-cat lawyers' who
were greedily stuffing their pockets with taxpayers' money."24 Later
Lord Chancellors also attacked the resulting conditional fee system
that arose as a substitute for legal aid. In 2008, for example, the Lord
Chancellor criticized the lawyers who represent clients on a "no win
no fee" basis: "It's claimed they have provided greater access to
justice, but the behaviour of some lawyers in ramping up their fees in
these cases is nothing short of scandalous.""
Filing fees increased dramatically beginning in the 1990s. Civil
justice, now identified as a mere dispute resolution service for citizens
with issues, was expected to pay for itself, and so fees were set to
approximate the actual cost of delivering court services. "The entire
cost, including the cost of the judges, was to be met from court fees."26
Perhaps more shockingly, figures from 2006 revealed that civil justice
was producing a "profit" of E30 million, which was used to offset the
cost of criminal cases rather than to support the structures needed for
civil adjudication." Instead, the civil part of the budget was cut
further.28 The results are visible and go beyond the number of judges
per pending case. According to Genn, the result was "[i]nadequate
information technology; stressed administrative staff; too few books
23. GENN, supm note 1, at 41 (alteration in original) (quoting DEP'T FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A FAIRER DEAL FOR LEGAL AID, 2005, Cm. 6591, In2.12-.18
(U.K.)).
24. Id. at 44 (citing David Hughes, Irvine To Name the LegaLAidProfitees, DAILY
MAIL, Apr. 28, 1998, at 29).
25. LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, 1 REVIEW OF CIVIL LmGATION COSTS: PRELIMINARY
REPORT 2 (2009), available at http://judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/reports/review-
of-civil-litigation-costs/civil-litigation-costs-review-reports. Ironically, because the govern-
ment itself is sometimes the defendant in these cases (as when a medical malpractice case is
brought against the national health service, or a local authority is sued for failing to act
properly) under a "loser pays" system, the government ends up paying the legal fees of the
lawyers who sued it when the suits are successful.
26. GENN, supra note 1, at 47.
27. See SIR HENRY BROOKE, SHOULD THE CIVIL COURTS BE UNIFIED? 175, at 30
(2008), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/reports/civil/civil-
courts-unification. The Ministry of Justice reported in 2008, however, that the "over-
recovery"-caused by the fact that county court fees exceeded the cost of running county
courts-had been eliminated. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CIVIL COURT FEES 2008, at 10 (2008),
available athttp://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/civil-court-fees-2008-consultation.htm. It
also endorsed the general rule that "[c]ourt fees should be set, so far as possible, at levels that
reflect the full cost of the process involved." Id. at 7 (alteration in original).
28. BROOKE, supra note 27.
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for the judiciary; rushed listing; and judges required to wander down to
waiting rooms to collect their next case because there is no one else to
do it for them."29
Genn describes the public areas of some civil courthouses as
"squalid" and "run down," comparing them to the "worst to be found
in NHS hospitals."" If public confidence in the system is one piece of
what makes a civil justice system work, this decreased ability to track
and process cases can only cause further damage to the courts' ability
to maintain public respect for law and the legal system.
Faced with declining budgets and increasing concern about the
expense of litigation, the Lord Chancellor in 1994 commissioned Lord
Woolf to oversee a study of civil justice. When the resulting report
recommended "pre-action protocols" that would resolve some cases
before filing, as well as rules that ration pretrial processes, impose
deadlines, and all but require mediation, the potential budgetary relief
must have been welcome. Genn does not suggest that Lord Woolf's
intention was to save money and notes that he certainly "did not intend
civil justice to be subsequently starved of resources."" Nevertheless,
the rhetoric32 and recommendations of his report were "available to be
used by government to support and justify squeezing resources for the
civil courts."" If the problem with the civil courts is inefficiency and
the bad behavior of lawyers, they need more adult supervision, not
more funding.
Ten years after the Woolf reforms were implemented, a new study
documents (mostly anecdotally) what most suspected: the cost of
litigation to the litigants has increased rather than decreased. Prefiling
exchanges of information and demands still take lawyer time (and
fees); procedures that front-load lawyer activity may actually increase
party costs; status conferences are billed by the hour; lawyer drafting
of written witness statements takes considerable time; and attorney
participation in mediation (and sometimes the mediator's time as well)
must be paid for.' Nevertheless, from the perspective of court budgets
29. GENN, supra note 1, at 51 (alteration in original).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 58.
32. Id at 53-54. Woolf blamed the adversarial attitudes of lawyers for the delays in
processing disputes, using labels like "battlefield" and "gamesmanship" and accusing them
of massive flouting of the rules. Id
33. Id. at 58.
34. LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT
(2009), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/reports/review-of-
civil-litigation-costs/civil-litigation-costs-review-reports; see also Anthony Clarke, The Woolf
Reforms: A Singular Event or an Ongohng Poess?, i THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES TEN
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the last decade has seen savings-the numbers of both filings and
trials are down."
Other than speed and expense, the impact of the changes on
outcomes is still largely unknown. Genn notes throughout this book
that research has not been done to assess the changes' effect on the
ability of citizens to access the courts, the fairness of settlements, or
the quality of decisions in the disputes that make it to trial. Since
settlement rather than adjudication is the focus, the value of procedure
is its ability to move cases along, and the availability and use of
evidence is immaterial. Whether procedural changes have affected the
accuracy of outcomes and the enforcement of legal norms is largely
undiscussed." Using her own anecdote, Genn recounts a conversation
with a court manager who noticed a dramatic reduction in the number
of cases seeking to remove children from dangerous homes. It seems
that the filing fee for such cases had increased from E150 to £4000,
and the local authorities were balancing the need to protect children
against their own budgetary limits."
C The Selling ofADR
Genn is not antimediation. She acknowledges that it is "an
important supplement to courts [that has] rightly become a feature on
the landscape of dispute resolution."" Further, Genn notes that "the
public and the legal profession should be properly educated about the
YEARS ON 33, 47 (D~irdre Dwyer ed., 2009) ("Litigation costs ... are still excessive in a
significant number of cases."); Robert Turner, Actively': The Word that Changed the Civil
Courts, i THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON, supr, at 77, 85-86 (attributing
excessive cost to inadequate funding for technology, staffing and salaries).
35. GENN, supma note 1, at 57. Professor Michael Zander suggests, however, that the
numbers were already decreasing prior to the Woolf reforms. See Michael Zander, The
WoolfReforms: Whath the Verdict., in THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON, supra
note 34, at 417, 427.
36. For one recent academic exception from Canada, see Colleen M. Hanycz, More
Access to Less Justice: Efficiency Proportionality and Costs in Canadian Civil Justice
Reform, 27 C.Q.J. 98 (2008). Genn herself did one of the few pieces of empirical research
involved in the Woolf reforms-a baseline study of litigation in the county courts-that was
intended to help assess the impact of the changes. Hazel Genn, The Pre-Woolf Litigation
Landscape in the County Courts (2002) (unpublished), findings reported in Hazel Genn,
Solving Civil Justice Problems: What Might Be Best? 2 (Jan. 19, 2005), http://www.ucl.
ac.uk/laws/academics/profiles/docs/genn_5.civiljustice-problems.pdf
37. See GENN, supra note 1, at 75. The much-publicized death of a child did lead to a
study of this issue. See FRANCIS PLOWDEN, REVIEW OF COURT FEES IN CHILD CARE
PROCEEDINGS (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/court-fees-child-
care-cases.htm (recognizing the principle of full-cost charging, but concluding that fees may
at least marginally influence decisions about at-risk children).
38. GENN, supma note 1, at 79.
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potential of mediation from the earliest possible moment and . .. that
mediation facilities should be made easily available to anyone
contemplating litigation."39 Nevertheless, her second Hamlyn Lecture
asked "who and what is driving ADR policy, and why."'
Judging Civil Justice raises the same kinds of concerns when
addressing mediation as when deploring the underresourcing of civil
courts. Voluntary resolution of disputes can be a good thing-but it
should not be foisted on the unwilling in the interest of reducing the
need for court funding, and it should not be sold through anticourt,
antilaw condemnation of civil adjudication.
Nor is Genn comfortable with mediation's emphasis on resolution
rather than rights. Here she invokes the story of her mother-in-law:
For example, take my mother-in-law's stair lift which she bought a few
months ago at considerable expense and which keeps sticking. The
installers have twiddled with it, but it is still sticking. They refuse to
come back again. She keeps getting stuck. Is this a problem involving
a clash of morally equivalent interests-the installer's interest in not
having to come out to fix it and my mother-in-law's interest in not
getting stuck halfway up her stairs one night on the way to bed since she
lives alone and is immobile? Or is this about the seller's obligation
under the contract to ensure that the stair lift is in working order and my
mother-in-law's right as a consumer to have a working stair lift?"
English authorities have tried very hard to motivate disputants
and their solicitors to mediate. The civil procedure rules allow courts
to order stays for mediation and to penalize with cost orders parties
who refuse to attempt mediation. On the legal aid side, litigation
funding will be denied if there is any informal alternative. As a policy
matter, the funding code provides that "all forms of ADR are accepted
to have at least equal validity to court proceedings.'"' And once again,
judges as well as mediators suggest that litigation is both undesirable
and a sign of failure.
Genn argues that litigation needs to remain the main event with
mediation the alternative, rather than the other way around.
"Mediation without the credible threat of judicial determination is the
sound of one hand clapping."' And in order to fulfill even this
39. Id. at 80.
40. Id. at 79.
41. Id. at 122-23.
42. LEGAL SERVS. COMM'N, THE FUNDING CODE PART 3: DECISION MAKING
GUIDANCE para. 7.2, at 129 (2005), http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/manualr)3_volume-
3-pt..c.pdf.
43. GENN, supm note 1, at 125.
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function, the civil courts must be an acceptable choice. "We need
modem, efficient civil courts with appropriate procedures that offer
affordable processes for those who would choose judicial determi-
nation."
D. The Role ofJudges
Genn's chapter on the role of judges demonstrates her respect and
empathy for those who undertake the difficult task of judging. Her
work in judicial training and on the judicial appointments commission
has given her "a keen interest in the challenges that the judiciary face
in civil cases, how they do what they do and the pressures under which
they increasingly and often, in my view heroically, work."' She notes
the almost complete lack of empirical study of how judges, especially
trial judges in the lower courts, do their work. This, in turn, makes it
difficult to decide what kinds of skills one should seek in a judge as
well as what kind of training those judges should receive to help them
handle the cases that come before them. And this lack of information
comes at a time when "the reforms of civil justice, together with
resource pressures, have fundamentally changed the nature of the
judicial role. ... The post-Woolf judge in the civil courts is an active
case manager [who must] balance values of efficiency, equality,
expedition, proportionality and careful allocation of the scarce
resources of the court."'
Recent changes to the jurisdiction of the various English courts
has pushed more and more legal business to the District Judges, those
"in the trenches" of everyday disputes. (This is also a budget-cutting
measure, as proceedings in the lower courts are less expensive, not
least because judicial salaries are lower there.) A low level of funding
for civil litigation means that these judges have a heavy case load
without sufficient resources to cope with it. Much of their work is
done in chambers, involves a wide variety of legal issues, and is
brought by and against pro se litigants. Genn fears that it is in these
courts, where the problems of the less legally sophisticated and less
powerful citizens are determined, that the lack of resources creates a
particular strain-a strain that cannot be helped with preaction
44. Id.; cf Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, Master of the Rolls, Mediation: An
Integral Part of Our Litigation Culture (June 8, 2009) (agreeing with primacy of litigation,
but supporting the propriety of mandatory mediation and urging lawyers to increase the
percentage of settled cases to a number in excess of ninety-eight percent).
45. GENN, supm note 1, at 127.
46. Id at 172-73.
2010] 257
TULANE LA WRE VIEW
protocols, shorter timetables, or limits on adversarial lawyers. And the
justice system's ability to aid these ordinary citizens is a fundamental
function on which its legitimacy depends.
1II. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
American lawyers, judges, academics, and legislators should read
this book. It is, in part, an antidote to the oft-repeated claims that the
expansive nature of the U.S. civil procedure rules is uniquely
responsible for cost and delay, and that if its courts would only return
more closely to its common law roots the problem would disappear.
Genn's book is, instead, evidence that England's extensive prefiling
requirements, particularized pleading rules, and active management
have not provided the silver bullet that will make litigation fast and
cheap.47 More, it is a cautionary tale about the dangers of viewing civil
courts as providing benefits only to the disputing parties. There are
many parallels between the English and U.S. experiences, and it is
sometimes easier to recognize problems in someone else's system than
when examining one's own.
A. The Tie Between Publc Good and Public Funding
As was true in England, opinion leaders in the United States have
been waging a campaign for decades to convince the public that civil
litigation is a bad thing. Part of this has been aimed at denigrating
individual plaintiffs and the lawyers who represent them. Political and
business elites promoted a "jaundiced view" of the civil justice system,
declared a "litigation explosion," and launched a campaign to limit
corporate responsibility, reduce tort litigation, and make access to the
courts more difficult.48 Even scholars who have no intention to
demonize civil litigation have tended at times to characterize it as a
purely private matter, so that, for example, there is no reason to make
discovered information public, to limit secret sealed settlements, or to
be wary of arbitration clauses.49
47. It is worth noting that civil law jurisdictions in Europe have also turned to case
management, although perhaps to a lesser degree. See generally JUDICIAL CASE
MANAGEMENT AND EFFICIENCY IN CwIL LrIGATION (C.H. van Rhee ed., 2008).
48. See, eg., Marc Galanter, An Oil Strke n Hell: Contemporary Legends About
the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 717 (1998); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An
Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); see also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial
Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science: Lessons fom West Virginia, 110 W
VA. L. REV. 1097 (2008).
49. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognzng (At Last) that the
Federal Rules Do Not Declaw that Discovery Is Presumptively Publi, 81 Cu.-KENT L. REv.
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What American proceduralists may not have seen coming is the
logical extension of this philosophy-if courts merely provide a
service to private disputants, those disputants should pay for the cost of
disputes, and the way they do that is through filing fees. Although the
English system does provide fee reductions for the impecunious and
subsidizes some family and small claim matters, about eighty percent
of the cost of the civil side of the court system is paid for through user
fees.so Filing fees alone can exceed E1000, and then each step in the
process-such as assigning the case to a track, filing motions, holding
hearings, and receiving orders-also requires the payment of a fee."
Compared to that, filing fees in most U.S. courts are modest,52 and the
cost of running the courts comes from state and local government
budgets."
Government funding problems, however, could make the "full
cost recovery" fee option appealing to American politicians. Even
before the current global financial crisis, U.S. courts--especially state
courts-were underfunded. For example, a 2003 study by the National
Center for State Courts found that in response to budget cuts, 84% of
states had frozen or delayed hiring, 56% had reduced training, and
31% had cut funding to specialty courts.54  The next year, an ABA
study found similar examples: the state of Alabama lost 475 court
positions due to budget cuts, and New Hampshire suspended jury trials
for a month to avoid having to pay jurors their per diem fees." More
recently things have gotten worse. California now closes its courts on
the third Wednesday of every month, and Georgia courts can have a
sixty-day wait for temporary custody hearings." Kentucky's court
331 (2006); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REv. 427, 501-02 (1991); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from
MandatoryRules: PrvatizmgLawThroughAbiftion, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703 (1999).
50. Why We Charge Court Fees, HER MAJESTY'S COURTS SERVICE, http://www.
hmcourts-service.gov.uk/infoabout/fees/whywecharge.htm (last visited May 18, 2010).
51. HER MAJESTY'S COURTS SERVICES, CIVIL AND FAMiLY COURT FEES 2 (2010),
http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/courtfinder/forms/ex5Oe.pdf.
52. See, eg., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL FILING FEES IN STATE TRIAL
COURTS (2010), available at http://www.ncsc.org/Information-and-Resources/Budget-
Resource-Center/Fines-and-fees.aspx.
53. See, eg., AM. BAR Ass'N, FUNDING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM: How ARE THE COURTS
FUNDED? 5 (2009).
54. Id at 6. Even in the comparatively better-funded federal courts, the pressure of
the criminal caseload (exacerbated by the War on Drugs and the Speedy Trial Act) took
resources away from the civil side. See THOMAS M. MENGLER, FEDERAL CIVIL JURISDICTION:
A REPORT To THE LONG RANGE PLANNING COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 3 (1993).
55. AM. BARAss'N, supmanote 53, at 6.
56. Editorial, State Courts at the Tippmng Poih4 N.Y TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009, at A30.
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system received an $8 million budget cut, leading the chair of its
House Judiciary Committee to warn that "we're getting perilously
close to reducing services that must be provided to the public."" As in
Genn's example of the district courts in England, the institutions that
are often hardest hit by budget woes are those whose work impacts the
vulnerable. "The brunt of the budget cuts has fallen on the high-
volume courts hearing family and juvenile matters, misdemeanors and
small-claims disputes.""
Faced with those budget pressures, it will be tempting for
politicians to make further cuts to court budgets, especially on the civil
side. In order to avoid even greater congestion and delay, courts out of
self-preservation will face the temptation to push cases out-whether
by raising filing fees, requiring prefiling mediation, or by changing the
actual procedure rules to block unpopular or expensive litigation.
B. The Tie Between Public Fundng and StMtegies To Deter Court
Use
Budget problems and procedural reform are not often talked
about together, but the need to cut costs can make certain kinds of
changes appealing. Any suggestion of cost-cutting as a motivation,
however, is extremely controversial. Genn's suggestions that the
English government's desire to cut civil court funding lay behind Lord
Woolf's reforms has caused pointed backlash, albeit in a polite
academic way. Lord Woolf has taken offense at the suggestion that his
goal was to cut costs. At a 2009 seminar at University College
London, Woolf argued that Genn was "absolutely wrong" and had
misunderstood the motivation behind the systemic overhaul of the civil
procedure rules." He was not asked, he said, to find ways to save costs
but to find ways to improve civil justice. Woolf also suggested that
Genn had been over-influenced by American academic critics, and
commented that the lectures did not reflect "the Hazel I knew.""
57. Tom Loftus, Fhal Courts Budget Less Than Either House or Senate Had Passed
COURIER-JOURNAL, Apr. 8, 2010 (alteration in original).
58. Editorial, supra note 56. In addition to decreased court resources, there is
decreased funding to help fund legal representation for the poor in civil cases. This same
time period has seen civil legal aid budgets shrink, not only from state budget cuts but also
because revenues from state IOLTA programs-Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts-have
plummeted as their income depends on the interest rate set by the Federal Reserve.





There are, however, at least hints here and there that reform and
budget limitations are related. Some come from other common law
countries. At about the same time that Lord Woolf was doing his study
in England, civil justice reviews in other countries assumed the need to
limit government spending on civil justice and latched onto case
management and ADR as the answer.6 In 1994, for example, Ontario
set up a review of civil justice whose mandate was to "maximize the
utilization of public resources allocated to civil justice."62 Its 1995
report recommended the integration of ADR and case flow manage-
ment.63 Australian reforms in the 1990s were also motivated at least in
part by the need to reduce spending on courts and legal aid." The
terms of reference that led to the 2000 report of the Australian Law
Reform Commission, Managing Justice, started with a call for a
"simpler, cheaper" legal system, and the report noted the need for legal
aid to strive for "optimal use and coordination of limited resources."'
A study of civil procedure reform in Trinidad and Tobago noted that
"there will always be reluctance amongst politicians and taxpayers to
increase the size of the slice which the cost of the Administration of
Civil Justice is to be allowed from the National Pie."' As Genn points
out, the pattern around the world was the same: "the wholesale
introduction of ADR, cost control, stripping down of procedure and
active case management by the judiciary to save costs to the justice
system and the parties.""
U.S. sources also link court budget concerns with the movement
toward case management and ADR. Resnik has noted that the
American institution of the managerial judge began as a response to
claims that federal judges were lazy and inefficient.6 ' Hensler explains
that decreased budgets, coupled with increased case filings, gave rise
to the case management movement." Certainly one motivation for the
judicial case management requirements of the Civil Justice Reform
61. GENN, supm note 1, at 58.
62. Id at 59.
63. Id
64. Ted Wright, Australia: A Need for Clarty, 20 JUST. Sys. J. 131, 146-49 (1999).
65. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, MANAGING JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL CivIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3, 17 (2000).
66. Case Management in Trindad and Tobago, TRIN. & TOBAGO, http://www.trinidad
tobagolaw.com/litigation/case.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
67. GENN, supm note 1, at 68.
68. Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 394, 397-99 (1982).
69. Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute




Act was to reduce the resources needed by the federal courts by
making them more efficient.7 ' And today, court personnel responsible
for implementing various managerial tasks are aware that they must
justify their existence by saving money.'
As in England, a more explicit call to save court dollars could
lead to dramatic increases in filing fees, which could both raise
revenue and decrease demand. This option has at least been discussed
in the United States. The Long Range Plan for the federal courts,
proposed back in 1995, rejected the idea of raising fees based on the
committee's concern that high fees would price low- and moderate-
income litigants out of federal courts.72 But academic commentators
have suggested fee hikes for some time, and some state courts have
begun to experiment with raising fees as a revenue source."
Increasingly tight state budgets may reinforce this trend.74
Both Genn's description of the English situation and the
American experience give reasons for caution in associating budget
savings with most management techniques, however. Unless a
technique keeps a case entirely out of the court system (for example, a
requirement for prefiling exchange of information and settlement
offers) or effortlessly moves a case that would have taken time out of
the system (for example, a mechanically generated mediation order
that results in settlement of a case that would otherwise have occupied
judicial time), judicial management might or might not save court time
and money. As researchers have pointed out, hands-on management
can actually take more rather than less time, and any time spent on
70. Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations on
Implementation of the Pilot Program of the Civil Justice Reforn Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 1303, 1305 (1994).
71. See, e.g., Robert W Rack, Jr., Thoughts of a Chief Circuit Mediator on Federal
Court-Annexed Mediation, 17 OuIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 609, 622 (2002) (noting that the
court-annexed mediation program "was created and is expected to settle cases; our primary
cost justification to Congress and court budget managers must be related to case
terminations, that is, settlements").
72. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
95-96 (1995). The committee also worried that fees would be an unreliable source of
revenue. Id Some commentators have suggested that the court should raise fees to
something closer to actual cost because otherwise the demand for litigation is artificially
high. See, e.g., Patrick E. Longan, Congress, the Courts, and the Long Range Plan, 46 AM.
U. L. Rav 625, 661-63 (1997).
73. Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future ofJudicial Federalism: 'Neither Out Far
NormA Deep, "45 CASE W RES. L. REv 705, 731 (1995); see also Rex E. Lee, The American
Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs ofLibgation., 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 267,
268 (1985) (discussing free-rider concerns associated with a publicly funded judicial system).
74. Don J DeBenedictis, Struggling Toward Recovery, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 50,
52-53; see Baker, supd note 73.
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cases that would have settled without judicial intervention is a net
increase in demand on court resources." Compulsory mediation may
save the system money if the parties must privately pay the mediator
but will increase costs for the court system if mediation is provided by
government-paid neutrals.
If courts are going to innovate with an eye toward budget savings,
we can expect more of the kind of procedures that remove cases from
the courthouse. Some of the possibilities: (1) pre-action protocols,
similar to those used in England, that prohibit filing lawsuits until the
parties have exchanged a quite specific series of pleading-like
documents, disclosures, and settlement discussions," with failure to
comply made the basis for fee shifting; (2) increased mandatory
referrals to noncourt mediation, with sanctions for failure to bargain
reasonably; (3) increased enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses, including delegation to the arbitrator of all questions including
the enforceability of the arbitration clause so that the disputes are not
brought to court at all; and (4) significantly higher filing fees, caps on
attorney fees, and increased "loser pays" cost shifting in an effort to
deter the filing of lawsuits." On the procedure rule end of the
spectrum, we may also see more judicial interest in motions to dismiss
on the pleadings-taking the place of summary judgment motions as
the favored filtering device-because those motions take less judicial
time and get cases out of the system earlier."
Alternatively, courts might fight back. Perhaps emboldened by
Genn's Hamilyn Lectures (one of which was delivered in Edinburgh),
the civil justice review in Scotland tried making the case that a better
justice system warrants increased funding. Led by Lord Gill, the
review did recognize "the cost of litigation to the public purse."" But it
75. See, e.g., James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management Further Analysis of
the Civd Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data 39 B.C. L. REv. 613, 624-25 (1998) (using the
example of early neutral evaluation and judicial help with discovery planning).
76. See, eg., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE PRE-AcroN PROIOCOL FOR PERSONAL INJURY
CLAIMs (2010), available at http://wwwjustice.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/menus/protocol.
htm. Most are subject-specific, as well as quite specific as to content.
77. Empirical studies of the effect of cost-shifting rules, however, reveal that their
impact on costs is quite complex and under some circumstances, a "loser pays" rule will
increase rather than decrease costs. See JACKSON, supm note 25, at 91-92.
78. SeegenerallyAshcroft v. Iqbal, No. 07-1015 (U.S. May 18, 2009); Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Summary judgment motions, because they may require
reviewing an extensive record, are generally more time-consuming for courts than 12(b)(6)
motions. Cf Iqbal, No. 07-1010, at 10 (explaining why the Iqbal order that refused to
dismiss the case was appealable).




also forthrightly acknowledged the stress put on the civil docket by the
needs of the criminal caseload. "Our remit requires us to consider to
some extent the interaction of the criminal courts with the civil justice
system. We remain convinced that no real progress can be made in the
civil justice system until the distorting effects of criminal business are
removed.""o Lord Gill's review proceeded to make several recom-
mendations that would in fact require increased government spending
on the court system, such as the introduction of new courts and judges,
improved information technology, and the establishment of a
permanent Civil Justice Council. "Good justice does not come cheap;
but, just as importantly, it requires the effective expenditure of
money."" How the Scottish Parliament will react to the suggestions
remains to be seen.82
In a similar way, US. court systems have sometimes challenged
legislatures to provide more funding and tried to articulate the loss to
the public when the civil courts function poorly. Some have even
resorted to litigation in an effort to force budget increases.83 The long-
term success of such efforts, though, would require convincing
taxpayers (in an era of Tea Party protests) that litigation is in fact a
public good, not just a service that, like trash collection or the
neighborhood crime watch, should be paid for by those who use it.
C The Disconnect Between Saving Court Costs and Saving Party
Costs
When discussing cost savings, it is imperative to ask, "cost
savings for whom?" Measures that might save taxpayer spending on
courts may easily have no effect at all on lowering litigant costs and
may in fact raise them. This proved to be the case with Lord Woolf's
80. Id. at iii.
81. Id. at ix.
82. Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill, in response to a question about the govern-
ment's intentions, said on March 11, 2010:
The large group of recommendations for structural changes to the judicial
hierarchy and for the different handling of cases in the proposed new structures are
closely intertwined and currently subject to a costing exercise being undertaken
jointly by the Scottish Court Service and the Scottish Government; the costs of
recommended reform will be jointly considered by the government and the judicial
working group established by the Lord President before the government publish a
formal response to the recommendations, later in 2010.
Parliamentary Questions and Answers: Wten Answers Before the Scottish Parliament
(2010) (statement of Kenny MacAskill, Justice Secretary), available at http://www.scottish.
parliament.uk/business/pqa/wa-10/wa03 11 .htm.
83. See Baker, supra note 73, at 726-27.
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reforms in England, so that after ten years of practice under
management-heavy procedure rules, there is near unanimous agree-
ment that party costs have increased rather than decreased. Some even
attribute increased party costs to decreased funding of court
infrastructure.' The same is likely to be true in the United States, as
the early Kakalik study of case management indicated." While many
hope that curtailed discovery and earlier settlements may offset the
cost of increased attorney activity required by case management, those
savings have not been documented in the United States and the
English example suggests they will not be.
If Genn's inferences are correct, it is British politicians (and some
judges) who have promoted management and diversion schemes in
order to reduce the cost of running the civil court system. In the
United States, on the other hand, adoption of case management
methods seems to have grown initially out of the judges' own desire to
manage mega cases, and lawyers' desire to interact more regularly with
judges." More recently, the turn from deadline-setting management to
procedure-rationing management came more from repeat litigants who
perceived themselves as more likely to benefit from limits on
discovery and other pretrial processes." Their interest in saving money
for themselves as litigants will not overlap perfectly with the
government's interest in reducing the cost of maintaining civil courts
or with judges' interest in coping with reduced resources.
Nevertheless, as party costs remain high, and as court budgets
come under increased strain, the alliance of interest between budget
writers and defense lawyers (together with the judges' own desire to
move cases quickly through their dockets) may create momentum to
further ration access to courts and their processes. This can be seen
already in the rhetoric of the Supreme Court in its recent pleadings
cases, echoing defendants' complaints about the cost of discovery.
Dismissal without discovery is required, they say:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement
to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process
84. Turner, supra note 34, at 85-86.
85. Kakalik et al., supra note 6, at 12-15.
86. Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional
Rulemalng on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REv. 133, 153-95
(1997).
87. For example, the practices mandated by the Civil Justice Reform Act were
spurred on by the claims of Vice President Quayle's Council on Competitiveness. The
current proposals to limit discovery and require fact pleadings were instigated in part by the
American College ofTrial Lawyers and other corporate counsel groups.
2010] 265
TULANE LA WREVIEW
through "careful case management" given the common lament that the
success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on
the modest side.88
Approaches that terminate disputes quickly and permanently will have
increasing appeal for all but the parties whose rights have become
more difficult to assert, and who have lost the courts as an institution
to help even out disparities in information and resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
Who can pinpoint the dominant factor in mixed motives, or sort
out the different concerns of different members of the legal elite? And
whatever the motive, government actors are unlikely to say, "we know
that this process will result in a poorer quality of justice, but it's all
we're willing to provide. The taxpayers will give you a Focus, not a
Ferrari." Yet it is quite clear that the civil justice system is currently
making decisions that some cases are worth more resources than
others. Calls for proportionality seem to indicate that the monetary
stakes are the primary sorting mechanism, and the Woolf reforms in
England created "tracks" that work along these lines." Other rationing
decisions, however, are linked to particular types of claims, using
devices such as imposing a floor on justiciable personal injury claims,
rerouting employment claims to administrative tribunals, or creating
noncourt compensation systems for certain types of disputes. In some
Australian states, for example, an injured person may not sue for
personal injury damages unless she can show a particular percentage
of permanent whole person impairment under the American Medical
Association Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.90
People may agree or disagree with the decisions to deny court access
or the setting of the cutoffs. But these schemes do at least publicly
88. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (citation omitted); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, No. 07-1015, slip op. at 21 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (alteration in original)
(referring to "[o]ur rejection of the careful-case-management approach").
89. Cf TEX. R. Civ. P. § 190 (West 2010) (listing discovery control plans with
different default limits based on amount in controversy).
90. Liability and Damages Act 2003 (N. Terr.) (Austl.); Insurance Reform Act 2003
(Vict.) (Austl.); seeAddress by the Honourable JJ Spigelman AC, Chief Justice of N.S.W, to
the Anglo-Australian Lawyers Society & the British Insurance Law Association at Lincoln's
Inn, London June 16, 2004) and at the London Market at Lloyd's (July 6, 2004),
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.aullawlink/supreme_court/ll-sc.nsf/pages/SCO -speech spigelma
n160704 (characterizing personal injury negligence law as a relic of the welfare state). See
genemllyMotor Accidents Compensation Regulation 2005 (N.S.W.) (Austl.).
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acknowledge and attempt to justify decisions about the use of the civil
courts.
The transubstantive nature of U.S. procedure means that rationing
decisions are not usually made-or not openly made-based on the
subject matter of the litigation." However, even when applying facially
neutral procedure rules, court decisions have heightened pleading
requirements for some types of cases based on a desire to discourage
litigation in those areas.92 Case management encourages similar evalu-
ative decision making, because the judge is called on to decide how
much process a particular case is worth, in light of other competing
uses for the courth tine. Yet with this type of management rationing,
neither the individual judge nor the court system is required to publicly
articulate the reasons that certain cases or types of cases deserve more
resources than others. Genn's challenge to the English courts applies
to other countries as well. It is neither efficient nor politically honest
to allow ad hoc decisions about what process is due. "We need a
strategy for the cases that we want to encourage into the system and
those that we would prefer to discourage and we need to articulate our
reasons for both of these choices.""
Judging Civl Justice is an important book that can give
proceduralists additional perspectives on familiar issues. Whether one
admires case management or finds it worrying; whether one advocates
more privatization of dispute resolution or seeks a return to public
trials; whether one believes in better court funding or less government
spending, Genn's book raises crucial questions about civil justice that
should not be ignored, and her dose of empiricism and tough-love
belief in adjudication is an important voice in the debate.
91. Occasionally legislation, such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
passed by Congress in 1995, does clearly target a particular kind of litigation for less
favorable treatment.
92. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth ofNodce Pleadig, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 987,
995 (2003). Rule 11 may have been applied in different ways in different types of litigation.
See STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSYTION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK
FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 71-72 (1989) (noting that Rule 11 as
applied had a particular impact on civil rights cases).
93. GENN, supm note 1, at 76.
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